This paper examines broadly the intergovernmental structure in the Middle East and North Africa region, which has one of the most centralized government structures in the world. The authors address the reasons behind this centralized structure by looking first at the history behind the tax systems of the region. They review the Ottoman taxation system, which has been predominantly influential as a model, and discuss its impact on current government structure. They also This paper-a product of the Social Development Department, Sustainable Development Network-is part of a larger effort in the department to study local governance systems and decentralization in the client countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at syilmaz@ worldbank.org. discuss the current intergovernmental structure by examining the type and degree of decentralization in five countries representative of the region: Egypt, Iran, West Bank/Gaza, Tunisia, and Yemen. Cross-country regression analysis using panel data for a broader set of countries leads to better understanding of the factors behind heavy centralization in the region. The findings show that external conflicts constitute a major roadblock to decentralization in the region. 
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Introduction
There have been significant decentralization efforts in developing countries in recent decades. These efforts led to an extensive literature on the causes and consequences of both centralization and decentralization. In this paper, we examine decentralization and intergovernmental relations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a region that has lagged behind other developing regions in decentralization.
The MENA region has unique socio-economic and political characteristics. First, there is economic dependency on oil revenues particularly in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Second, the MENA region has one of the highest population growth rates in the world. This demographic explosion has led to young population structures throughout the region. Third, the region has been impacted by both internal and external conflicts that have affected economic performance of the countries.
Despite these good reasons to study government structure in the MENA, there is surprisingly sparse literature on the region. While recent studies followed a comparative perspective and showed similarities and differences between the decentralization efforts in a variety of developing countries, the MENA countries are left out of those comparisons (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006) . This is mainly due to lack of appropriate data and information on decentralization in the countries of the region. Our goal in this paper is to combine descriptive and empirical analyses to provide a comprehensive picture of decentralization and the reasons behind its slow progress. We also discuss some reform options.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we look at the history of decentralization and centralization in the region by examining the taxation system of the Ottoman Empire. We provide a comparative description of the intergovernmental structure in five MENA countries, Iran, Egypt, Tunisia, West Bank/Gaza and Yemen in Section 3. In Section 4 we explore the determinants of centralization and decentralization in the region in a regression analysis. We discuss the intergovernmental reform options in the final section.
Centralization in the MENA Countries: A Historical Perspective
MENA countries have relatively more centralized government structures compared to other developing countries. It is argued that many MENA countries have based their government organization on the administration structure of the Ottoman Empire.
Ottoman Taxation System
Overall, the Ottoman taxation was a centralized system of taxation. Lewis (1979) argues that Ottoman taxation included elements from Islamic taxation as well as from taxation law and practices of Roman, Byzantine, Mongolian, Turkish and pre-Islamic Persian civilizations. Cosgel (2005) examines the evolution of the tax system in the Ottoman Empire as a clash between competition and rigidity in institutions. For example he argues that while the Ottomans changed the tax system in the conquered lands to collect revenue in the most efficient way, they were faced with local institutional constraints. Hence, this explained the substantial regional variation in taxes throughout the empire.
Lewis also asserts that Ottoman tax administration changed from a relatively decentralized system with strong center to a weaker but more centralized system. This change started around the end of the sixteenth century. There had been a consolidation of tax collection after the sixteenth century, particularly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
1 While many argue that this coincides with the stagnation and decline in the Empire, Barkey (2008) argues that this "adaptation was a sign of flexibility and pragmatism, not a sign of decline." 2 In places such as Egypt more government centralization took place in accordance with heavier European influence (Hanna, 1995) .
In this centralization trend, we see a change from the Timar system (strong center with decentralized military expenditures) to Iltizam or Tax-farming system (weaker center with more centralization of military and more decentralization of other government services at the province level) towards the end of the sixteenth century. Timar is a landtenure system where the land was allocated to Sipahis (feudal cavalry) in return for military service in Ottoman provinces (Barkey, 1994: 36) . 3 In the Iltizam system the state receives an initial monetary sum from private interests in return for rights to collect taxes (Barkey, 2008: 229) . Some of the reasons for the system change from Timar to Iltizam were: Sipahi cavalry becoming less important due to introduction of new war technologies, higher demand for full-time regular troops, changing patterns of trade, influx of Spanish silver from America and subsequent inflation leading to a sharp 1 See Barkey (2008, Part 2) and Inalcik (1977) for excellent accounts of transformation in the Ottoman administration towards centralization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 2 Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, 194. 3 Inalcik (1994: 114-118) gives a detailed description of the Ottoman Timar system. As Inalcik notes, an interesting characteristic of the Ottoman Timar system was "the lack of inheritance rights on land and the frequent dismissal from timars" (Inalcik, 1994: 115) . With the Timar system, Ottoman state was able to maintain provincial armies without direct centralized expenditures. In addition, the lack of inheritance rights prevented timar holders from forming land-based hereditary nobility that could become a threat to the central authority.
decrease in real income (Lewis 1979 , Barkey 1994 . Barkey (1994) Reorganization period in the nineteenth century aimed at creating a more centralized government structure (Ortayli, 2006) . This was thought to be a way to save the Empire from total collapse.
McLure (2001) argues that tax assignment over different levels of government depends on history, and has been subject to change through economic evolution. Hence, he asserts there is no one-size-fits-all formula for tax assignment. Cosgel and Miceli (2005) examine the tax assignment in the Ottoman Empire in the mid-sixteenth century.
They provide evidence that the tax assignment was done according to a transaction cost hypothesis rather than risk hypothesis. They classify taxes into categories of fixed and variable taxes. Fixed taxes category includes personal taxes based on marital and economic status, input taxes based on production inputs such as land, trees and animals, and enterprise taxes. These taxes are thought to be less risky due to absence of factors that would cause variation and they also have lower transaction costs. Variable taxes category includes trade taxes from market exchange of goods in towns and output taxes such as taxes on grains, legumes and fibers. These taxes are riskier due to high variability and also carry greater transaction costs for the same reason. Using data from Ottoman tax registers (tahrir defterleri) the authors conduct an ordered probit analysis for the influences on tax assignments and find that the proportion of variable taxes are negatively associated with the higher levels of government lending support to the transaction cost hypothesis which asserts that variable taxes can be more efficiently collected at the local level due to lower transaction costs. The key underlying assumption here is that transaction costs are higher for higher levels of government. The authors conclude that transaction costs were more important in tax assignment in the Ottoman Empire.
However, they do not model fixed taxes specifically.
In summary, we see that the taxation system was not as centralized in the early period (until the end of the sixteenth century) of the Ottoman Empire as it was in the later period. Centralization gained momentum particularly during the Tanzimat (Reorganization) period in the nineteenth century when the empire was declining rapidly and consolidation of power at the center was seen as a solution to prevent total collapse.
Centralization that started in the sixteenth century is, by no means, unique to the Ottoman Empire. In fact, Europe started its transformation from small, decentralized city-states to large and centralized territorial states at the end of the fifteenth century. 4 It was also argued that European influence in the Middle East and North Africa fueled more government centralization (Hanna, 1995) . Aside from few courageous attempts at decentralization, the region inherited a heavily centralized system of taxation and public administration from the Ottoman Empire and other European States.
Comparison of Intergovernmental Structure in Selected MENA Countries
In this section, we examine the intergovernmental structure in a selected number
of MENA countries to demonstrate the centralized features of local government systems in the region. Our selection includes five countries representing both Maghreb and Mashreq regions. These are Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, West Bank/Gaza and Yemen. The central government in these countries is the senior partner in the intergovernmental relationship. The share of subnational expenditures in GDP is very low compared to OECD average of 17 percent 5 (see Table 1 ). In many countries in the MENA region, such as Yemen and Iran, a large share of the expenditures is disbursed through subnational governments that act as agents of central government ministries and departments. In these countries locally elected representatives have little decision-making power over expenditures.
Deconcentration and Decentralization in MENA
Overall, local government systems in the MENA region can be characterized as a form of deconcentration rather than one of devolved local self-government. In general, the public administration system is highly centralized, equipped with an elaborate system of deconcentrated field offices of line agencies. In the region, subnational deconcentrated governments have a very limited number of "own" responsibilities. Most of the local expenditure responsibilities can be classified as "delegated" expenditures as opposed to "own" expenditure responsibilities.
6
Central government ministries make decisions on most services that are traditionally provided by local governments in other countries (See Table 3 ). we assigned points to central, provincial and municipal government involvement in expenditures. Accordingly, we assigned 1 point to C, 2 points to P and 3 points to M.
7
Total expenditure assignment scores and average scores are listed in Table 4 . The average 6 Delegated responsibilities are those transferred to the deconcentrated branch units of the central government for delivery of services while the actual decisions on budgeting and financing are carried out at the central level. Some of the delegated responsibilities, such as primary education, health, and public security have high local public good characteristics and in many countries are not delivered by locally elected governments. 7 In addition we assigned 1.5 points to C, P; 2.5 points to P, M and 2 points to C, P, M. We gave 1 instead of 0 to central government assignments since the worldwide practice shows that some central government involvement is probably desirable to facilitate decentralization.
scores for countries across government services and government involvement show that West Bank/Gaza has the most decentralized expenditure system among the group followed, in order, by Egypt, Iran, Tunisia and Yemen. Other than West Bank/Gaza, all other countries in the region have largely an adhoc local revenue system. The only exception might be property tax system in Iran. We see a glimpse of autonomy in land-based taxation in Iran. Table 6 shows that allocation rules for transfers to local governments are also mainly ad-hoc, except in Tunisia and West Bank/Gaza. In both countries, the transfer system is based on a formula. In West Bank and Gaza municipalities have been 
Revenue Assignment
Intergovernmental Transfer Characteristics
Discussion
In this section, we presented an overview of the deconcentration and decentralization systems in selected MENA countries and compared these countries in terms of three important aspect of decentralization: expenditure assignment, revenue assignment and intergovernmental transfers. We also compared these countries to the worldwide practice in expenditure assignments. First, we see a good potential for a rich deconcentrated and decentralized government structure in MENA countries. Most of the countries analyzed have a good number of lower tier governments such as governorates, districts and a variety of municipalities (e.g. 1000 urban municipalities and 68,000 rural municipalities in Iran). Second, MENA countries are significantly behind the worldwide practice in decentralization regarding expenditure assignments. We see in Table 4 that this is particularly true in social services, which is one of the most important government expenditures that directly affect the welfare of residents. Third, West Bank/Gaza seems to have the greatest degree of decentralization from the perspective of both expenditure and revenue assignments. Among the countries analyzed, West Bank/Gaza gives the greatest autonomy to its local governments. While this highlights West Bank/Gaza as an interesting case to consider for other countries in the region, one should approach the decentralization efforts cautiously as the observed decentralization seems to spring from special political and security circumstances of that country. Finally, there is need for improvement in intergovernmental relations in MENA countries. Intergovernmental transfer rules are largely ad-hoc. Our comparative analysis leads us to conclude that MENA countries have highly centralized government fiscal structures. This is despite our observation that there is a potentially rich deconcentrated and decentralized government systems. In the next section, we will examine the reasons behind this heavy centralization using different regression analyses.
Determinants of Centralization and Decentralization
Measurement Issues and Review of the Literature
Decentralization is difficult to measure. Despite the popularity of decentralization 
Empirical Analysis
We are using an unbalanced panel for fourteen countries with a study period broadly from 1975 to 2004. 11 As mentioned above, we are examining centralization and decentralization in MENA in two parts. In the first set of regressions we use total budgetary central government expenditures as share of GDP as our dependent variable, which we see as a rough indicator of centralization. To address the shortcomings of this variable as a measure of centralization (or decentralization), we run a second set of regressions with a decentralization indicator derived from DPI as the dependent variable.
Given our key dependent variable measuring degrees of decentralization, which is thus inherently ordered, our second set of regressions are based on the probabilistic ordinal dependent variable regression model of the Logit type
) is the probability of observing { } Alesina and Spolaore also address the interaction between democratization and conflicts, 12 Note that higher risk points correspond to an improvement in the institutional variable. 13 This was recently used as a measure of governance quality by Knack (2001) . Components of these institutional variables, particularly corruption in government, were used in many other studies including Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) , Mauro (1996) and Knack and Keefer (1995) .
showing that democratization becomes a less important factor in reducing the size of countries when there are major conflicts. We also examine how the impact of democratization changes when external conflict is introduced into the empirical analysis.
Data on External Conflict also comes from the ICRG dataset. We adjusted this variable, however, to have higher points representing worsening of conflicts. 14 Finally, we use GCC as a dummy variable for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to control for the possible impact of heavy dependence on oil on the government structure of these countries. 
Empirical Results
We provide the summary statistics on the variables described above in Table 7 .
We start with the first set of regression results in Table 8 . In addition to the explanatory variables explained above, we also include country fixed effects in our Table 8 regressions. Hence, country characteristics such as land area, being an oil producer, and all time invariant institutional factors are captured by the fixed effects estimation. We also see that serial correlation of errors could be a serious problem in our data. We run AR(1) fixed effects regressions to correct for the serial correlation problem.
We find that the coefficients of the size variables, GDP per capita and Population have the expected negative sign but not statistically significant in all four regressions. Results from those regressions are shown in Table 9 . We get similar results to the ones in Table 8 . We find that the size variables, GDP per capita and Population have the expected positive sign and they are statistically significant in most of the regressions. The coefficient of the Share of Urban Population is negative and significant in all regressions, which is counter to the argument that urbanization triggers decentralization. We now get conflicting results from our institution variables in columns (1) trade openness also has a positive and significant association with decentralization.
In summary, our main findings show that improvements in the institutional variables have some negative effect on the centralization but these do not seem to be as important as the strong negative (positive) decentralization (centralization) effect of external conflicts. When we examine the marginal effect from external conflict in the ordered logit regression in column (4) of Table 9 , we compute that every one degree improvement in external conflict increases the probability of moving from a zero score in decentralization to a score of one by about 4%. This may look small but considering that MENA countries, on average, had an external conflict score of 10 out of a maximum of 12 in 2003, they have a lot of room for improvement in external conflicts. For example, if MENA countries manage to move to a zero score on external conflicts, which means no external conflicts, this would increase the same probability by 40%.
Intergovernmental Reform Options and Conclusions
Our empirical analysis gives us interesting insights into determinants of the central government's role in the economy. The most striking result is the significant role of external conflicts in centralization (or decentralization). It seems external conflicts set a major obstacle in decentralization. This would lend itself to a recommendation that countries in the region and other related countries should work together to remove this obstacle. As Tosun and Sen (2007) suggest regional conflict prevention is an international public good and a collective provision of this public good would ease the burden on central governments of individual countries. This will, in turn, release resources from the grasp of central governments that are currently charged wholly with the provision of this public good and make it available to the local governments.
A precondition for transferring additional resources to local governments is fixing intergovernmental fiscal systems. The most striking feature of the public management system in the MENA region is the degree of centralization. All countries in the region have a highly centralized administrative structure with very limited decision-making power assigned to local governments. For a variety of reasons (e.g., tradition, history, culture), responsibilities assigned to local governments have not been as extensive as those in many other parts of the world. In their efforts to reform local government sector, governments should recognize that decentralization requires sharing of fiscal roles and responsibilities between central and local governments accompanied by a robust capacity to deliver services both centrally and locally. The challenge is to determine how to sortout the responsibilities and financing among different types of local governments. It is important for the decision makers in the region that decentralization reforms may be asymmetric. They can set criteria to classify local governments into different categories that have asymmetric taxing and spending responsibilities and borrowing privileges. This would give impetus to decentralization reform process by which regional governments (governorates) and local governments might be empowered with increased autonomy in expenditure and revenue decisions. However, they should keep in mind that there is a need for systematically reviewing legal and regulatory standards for "sorting out" rules and responsibilities among different types and levels of governments.
Decentralization is a dynamic process where the intergovernmental relations system needs constant adjustments. The governments in the region should consider establishing a mechanism to (a) improve the design and gauge the direction, pace, and extent of decentralization, and (b) disseminate information, provide training and directly engage municipal governments in the decentralization process.
In the long run, the governments in the region need to devolve expenditure responsibilities further to local governments while making them fully accountable before their respective constituencies for policy results, in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency in delivering quality public services. To this end, they should consider strengthening local government accountability mechanisms by systemic collection, analysis, and dissemination of information about local fiscal performance and compliance with financial and policy goals. Such information is essential both to informed public participation through political process and to the monitoring of municipal performance by the central government.
An important issue in the MENA region is to increase local public expenditure efficiency in areas of concurrent expenditure responsibilities and creating strong incentives (financial and legal) to promote cooperative arrangements among local governments for service delivery. In this context, outsourcing public service to the private sector as well as private sector participation in both financing and delivery of public services can be a way to improve overall efficiency of local government expenditures.
In reforming local government systems the most challenging task for the governments in the region would be restructuring the overall revenue system in a manner that provides local governments "fiscal space" to strengthen own revenue and expenditure arrangements. The governments should first make sure that adequate steps are taken to establish accountability mechanisms, then boost revenue autonomy by giving local governments adequate decision-making powers on tax rates and the determination of some tax bases in order to improve budgetary predictability. They should gradually lift central government controls on local fees and taxes after making sure that local revenue mobilization is maintained.
An important characteristic of intergovernmental fiscal systems in the region is the use of ad hoc transfers. The governments should study rationalizing the transfer system so as to make it more effective instrument for the implementation of policies of national interest at the local level and reduce horizontal fiscal disparities. This would include an examination of conditional and unconditional (e.g., equalization) transfer systems alike. They should established transparent rule-base transfer system with explicit formulas for equalization. They should explore ideas for a combination of unconditional and matching open-ended type of grants that would to force municipal governments to exploit their revenue bases. A related topic is to enforce hard budget constraints for local governments. Governments in the region should credibly commit to a hard budget constraint and avoid bailing out local governments that get into a financial mess. 
Social Services
Social Welfare
Ports and Navigable Waterways
Interurban Highways C C,P C,P C,P,M C,P C,P C C,P C,P C,P,M C,P C,P C C,P,M C,P C,P,M C,P C,P
Utility Services
Water and Sewerage
Other Services
Fire Protection
C: Central Government P: Provincial Government M: Municipal Government N/A: Not applicable These services are national in scope, the central government has a role in correcting fiscal inefficiencies and regional inequalities, it should also provide some financing to cover spillovers. The overriding concern is the efficient provision of services. If the benefits accrue to local jurisdictions it should be financed by local residents. If the benefits of the service spillovers to other jurisdictions, the service is national in scope and the cost of service should be realized by nonresidents as well.
These services are local in scope; if the services are financed by national revenues, nonresidents bear the cost of services. In that case, inefficient allocation of resources is a major concern. However, preservation of internal common market might be an area of concern; central government might have a role in regulatory function to ensure efficiency and equitable provision of some of these services.
The primary beneficiaries of these services are local residents and they are most efficiently provided by local governments. Central Government (C) = 1 point Provincial Government (P) = 2 points Municipal Government (M) = 3 points C, P = 1.5 points P,M = 2.5 points C,P,M = 2 points ** Average score is calculated by dividing the sum of total scores for each country in the table by the total number of services listed in Table 2 . 
Egypt
There is a national tax sharing system combined with local tax and fee surcharges. Rates are set nationally and the central government collects a portion (25-50%) of local taxes into special national funds. Popular participation (down-payments of citizens) is the most important local revenue under the discretion of local governments.
Iran
All local levies are required to be consistent with the government's annual budget and the National Five Year Development Plans and to be in line with the capacity to pay as determined by the Ministry of Interior (ceiling for local tax/local income ratio). With adoption of the Law on Tax Amalgamation (2003) revenue collection has been effectively re-centralizes and almost all taxes are collected by the central government.
One of the main locally collected fees is the land use change and density increase tax.
Tunisia
LGs can set and administer local taxes on developed real-estates, but this right is rarely exercised. Other taxes, fees, and charges are introduced by central government decrees and managed by central agencies.
WBG
Of all the MNA-8 countries the WBG regulatory framework provides the greatest autonomy to the LGs. While
LGs have a right to set taxes or create new ones, they can do so through initiating amendments to the tax law. Many taxes and fees are collected and administered locally by LGs.
Yemen
Central government sets both tax rates and base, LGs can make proposals for taxes and fees. Apart from the religion tax ('zakat') most taxes are not collected in many districts particularly in rural areas. Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 197 197 197 197 Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Although the laws empower EPCs in overseeing the budget preparation and implementation as well as service delivery in their jurisdictions, in reality, EPCs are less powerful than the appointed executive council (Amin and Ebel, 2006) . They have limited power to play "any meaningful role in the preparation of the budgets of the jurisdictions they represent" (Amin and Ebel, 2006; 16) . Markaz (180) Village (1164) City (209) District (39) District (35) City (4) Governorate (22) Complex/ Rural and Urban Central Authority
Appendix B: Government Structure in Iran
The Iranian public administration system is composed of the central government and two types of local government units-deconcentrated line agencies and the municipal authorities. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran defines the deconcentrated local government units as governmental and municipalities as non-governmental units (see Table B These two structures make up the sub-national administration framework in Iran. The first type-public, governmental Sector (Umumi, Dowlati)-is referred as the deconcentrated (provincial) local governments. Line ministries providing services, such as gas, electricity, transportation, education and health, are organized sectorally at the provincial level and are coordinated at all levels through the MPO and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance (MEAF). The second type-public, non-governmental (Umumi Gheir-dowlati)-is referred as decentralized (municipal) local governments. The municipal sector is coordinated separately through Ministry of Interior's Municipalities Organization (MO) and provides urban municipal services including public health, recreational services including parks, public safety including fire stations and local transportation including buses and taxis as well as rural municipal services.
The subnational administration in Iran is primarily organized at the provincial level. For administrative purposes the country is divided into 30 provinces (ostan). The populations of ostans vary considerably with more than eleven million inhabitants in Tehran and fewer than 600,000 in the smallest ostans such as Ilam and Semnan. The ostans have subdivisions called districts (shahrestan). Shahrestans also have subdivisions called rural county (bakhsh). Ostans, shahrestans and bakhsh are deconcentrated governmental units and cover the whole territory of Iran.
The head of osthan administration is Ostandar, who is an appointed by the central government. Expenditures at the osthan level are organized through line agencies and spending units. These units are responsible for provincial expenditures while national public services such as defense and those public goods with significant externalities are assigned to the central units.
An important component of the subnational administration system in Iran is the local councils. Iran has an elaborate local council structure (Tajbakhsh, 2000) . There exists a hierarchically nested system of directly and indirectly elected councils. 16 In addition to the directly elected city and village councils, there are intermediate representative councils at geographic and administrative levels. At the lowest level, representatives from a group of directly elected village councils constitute a rural county council (bakhsh). At the district level, representatives from rural county and urban councils within a district make up the members of the district council. At the ostan level, representatives from each district council within an ostan send representatives to the ostan level council. Finally, Higher Council of Provinces is comprised of one representative from each ostan council. However, while the councils are the only source of local legislation, and the mayor, as the local executive, is charged with carrying out these decisions, the areas in which the council can legislate and pass bills is restricted. In fact, in relation to the entire range of issues that impact local economic development, the council and municipality has a secondary or almost no role. The restricted interactions and limited role of elected councils constitute a major obstacle to increased inclusiveness and accountability (Tajbakhsh, 2000) . This weak institutionalization, in conjunction with the enhanced role of the MO is among the factors that exacerbate Mayor-Council tense relations, primarily because mayors feel increasingly dependent upon Central Government and consequently less accountable to the Municipal Council (Tajbakhsh, 2000) . 
Appendix D: Government Structure in West Bank/Gaza
The local government system in West Bank and Gaza (WBG) reflects the realities of Israeli occupation. The overriding concerns in the design of local government system have always been providing emergency services and security through central control. As a result, laws, political system, administrative arrangements and development practices of local governments are geared towards these objectives rather than providing services to local communities.
Prior to the 1994 Oslo Peace Accord, in the absence of a sovereign state, Palestinian local governments have had to fend for themselves in providing services to local communities. The Ministry of Local Governments (MOLG) established in 1994 to help build an effective local government system. However, the current legal framework in WBG assigns the central government strong formal controls over local governments (World Bank, 2006) .
The Law on Local Authorities of 1997 (LLA) provides the legal basis for the current local government system in WBG. There are three different levels of local government units: 16 governorates, representing the central government at the regional level; 120 municipalities, providing public services in urban areas; 251 village councils, providing public services in rural areas.
LLA draws heavily on other regional country legislative frameworks, particularly that of Jordan. LLA grants significant powers to the central government, primarily Ministry of Local Government in its role as the sector regulatory agency, including provisions for approvals of a wide range of activities of local governments and claw-back clauses where autonomy appears to be granted (World Bank, 2006) .
Governorates are deconcentrated local government units operating at the provincial level. There are sixteen governorates (eleven in the West Bank, five in Gaza). Governors appointed by the President of the Palestinian Authority head governorates. They are charged primarily with security and public safety functions (World Bank, 2006) .
Municipalities are decentralized local government units with elected mayors and council members. Municipalities are classified into four categories based on population criterion 18 as well as location and date of establishment characteristics (See Table D -1).
The LLA provides the legal basis for municipal expenditure responsibilities and revenueraising authorities. However, a there is a significant mismatch between the legal assignments to municipalities and the reality on the ground (World Bank, 2006) . The absence of an effective public administration system compels the larger municipalities 18 Population figured prominently as a criterion for classification when first defined in the LLA. As stated in the LLA, wherever a local population exceeds 5,000, there is a basis for establishing municipality. This basic criterion has not been applied consistently as many of the newly established municipalities have population less than 5,000 (World Bank, 2006) . assume responsibilities that are not necessarily assigned to them by law, such as fire fighting service and maintenance of school buildings (World Bank, 2006) . The LLA grants the central government with extensive powers over municipal governments in terms of control over revenue sources. They have to obtain the approval of the central government in setting the tax rates and defining the revenue bases. Mostly within the confines of the centrally defined tax and fee bases, assessment strategies, and rates, the local governments are provided with revenue sources such as property taxes, building permits and utility revenues. They are also allowed to perform certain public functions and market services to raise additional revenues. Yet, in practice, the municipalities invent their own ways of raising revenues and they often find ways of rationalizing such practices in old laws (World Bank, 2006) . Furthermore, the municipalities impose new taxes or fees without an explicit approval of the central government and they collect and administer them locally. For certain revenue items, there are differences in practice between West Bank and Gaza. For example, while property taxes are collected and administered by the central government in West Bank, in Gaza municipalities collect and administer property taxes themselves.
